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INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court decided Davis v. Bandemer,' a common
reaction was that the Court had set forth inadequate standards for identifying partisan gerrymanders and thereby provided little or no guidance to
3
the lower courts. 2 I disagreed with that assessment at the time, and I
shall do so again presently. But even those most convinced of
Bandemer's fogginess must agree that it is a model of clarity when compared with the Court's second and 4most recent performance on partisan
gerrymandering, Vieth v. Jubelirer.
In Bandemer, the Democrats challenged Indiana's state legislative
districting plan, claiming that because it diluted the votes of Indiana
5
Democrats, it violated the Equal Protection Clause. In Vieth, the Democrats challenged the Pennsylvania congressional districting plan, claimt Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. I presented a draft of this
paper on October 23, 2004 at the Election Law Symposium of the Cornell Journal of Law &
Public Policy in Ithaca, New York. I appreciated the helpful comments of Richard Briffault
and Heather Gerken as well as the hospitality of the Journal's staff and of many faculty members and students at the Cornell Law School. The reference staff of the UCLA Law Library
gave me valuable research assistance.
1 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
2 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrrutroNAL LAW 1083-84 (2d ed.
1988). See generally DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW 329-30

(3d ed. 2004).
3 See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Bandemer's Gap: Gerrymandering and Equal Protection,
in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 64 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990) [hereinafter Lowenstein, Bandemer's Gap].
4 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
5 478 U.S. at 115.
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ing similarly that it denied Equal Protection because it was a partisan
gerrymander. 6 In Bandemer, a 6-3 majority ruled that the equal protection challenge was justiciable. Four members of that majority, combined
with the three justices who disagreed on justiciability, made a 7-2 majority to deny relief to the Indiana Democrats. 7 In Vieth, a plurality of four
justices would have overruled Bandemer's ruling in favor of justiciability. 8 Justice Kennedy, who could find no basis for identifying an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander but was unwilling to declare the
gerrymandering claim nonjusticiable, joined with the plurality to make a
majority for denial of relief to the Pennsylvania Democrats. 9
The Court produced five opinions in Vieth: a plurality opinion by
Justice Scalia,' 0 dissenting opinions by Justices Stevens, Souter", and
Breyer, and a pivotal opinion by Justice Kennedy. In my opinion, the
Court went 0 for 5 in Vieth. But none of the blame for the confusion the
Court created should fall on either the plurality or the dissenters. It was
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion that blazed a new trail on the frontier of judicial irresponsibility.
Vieth resembles Bandemer in one important respect. In both cases,
the justices failed to articulate what constitutional requirement or prohibition is at stake and how partisan gerrymandering might violate the
Constitution. The failure occurred in Bandemer because Justice White
began his plurality opinion in medias res. Contrary to the claims of those
who found insufficient guidance in his opinion, Justice White laid down
standards aplenty. But it was difficult to figure out what those standards
meant because, as I have argued, Justice White did not "moor [the standards] to the constitutional principles they [were] intended to effectuate."' 12 That was Bandemer's gap. Yet, just as it is sometimes possible
to reconstruct the earlier events of a story that begins in medias res, it
was possible to traverse the gap in Bandemer and reconstruct its underlying constitutional principles by extrapolating from Justice White's specific standards together with other clues in his opinion, including the
body of precedent on which he relied.
Vieth cannot be interpreted by that method. Justice Scalia correctly
asserts that each of the dissents is bereft of any account of the constitu6 See 541 U.S. at 272-73.
7 See 478 U.S. at 125.
8 See 541 U.S. at 281.
9 See id. at 309-10.
10 The plurality opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor

and Thomas.
11 Justice Souter's dissent was joined by Justice Ginsburg.
12 Lowenstein, Bandemer's Gap, supra note 3, at 66.
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13
tional principles that a partisan gerrymander may violate. In any event,
if we want to know what the law of partisan gerrymandering is in the
wake of Vieth, we must work with the opinions of Justices Scalia and
Kennedy, which between them speak for the majority that rejected the
constitutional claim. Neither opinion purports to set forth specific standards as did Justice White in Bandemer. Nor does either opinion provide
any other opening through which one might pursue the search for guiding constitutional principles.
Justice Scalia concedes that partisan gerrymandering can offend the
Constitution and therefore would warrant judicial regulation if only one
could separate the problematic cases from the constitutionally innocent.
As Justice Kennedy notes, Justice Scalia faces the inevitable difficulty
that confronts anyone who wishes to prove a negative-here, that no
workable standard can distinguish an unconstitutional partisan gerryman14
der from a permissible districting plan. Justice Scalia attempts to accomplish his proof by showing that several proposed standards-the one
adopted by the plurality in Bandemer, the one proposed by Justice Powell in his Bandemer dissent, the one proposed by the Vieth plaintiffs, and
the ones proposed by the dissenters in Vieth-are all inadequate. To succeed, Justice Scalia must show that each of these possibilities is a failure
and that no better standard is possible. I believe he fails on the first
count, but whether or not that is the case, Justice Kennedy is surely correct to suggest that the second count is, in the nature of things, a very
15
tough nut.
Justice Scalia's best chance to crack that nut would have been to
identify just what it is in the Constitution that he thinks might be offended by a partisan gerrymander. If he had done so, he might have been
able to show why the offensive trait is peculiarly difficult for courts to
identify. He attempts nothing of the sort. Because he limits himself to
debunking the constitutional standards proposed by others, his analysis is
entirely negative-albeit very cogently negative in all his attacks other
than the one on the Bandemer plurality opinion. Justice Scalia provides
no affirmative analysis from which we can extrapolate in order to reconstruct the constitutional principles on which he is relying, as was possible
in the case of the plurality opinion in Bandemer.

Addressing Justice Stevens' dissent, Justice Scalia observes that the Court "may not
willy-nilly apply standards-even manageable standards-having no relation to constitutional
harms." 541 U.S. at 295. Criticizing Justice Souter's proposed five-part test, he denies that any
test "can possibly be successful unless one knows what he is testing for." Id. at 297. Finally, he
says that "[d]espite his promise to do so, [Justice Breyer] never tells us what he is testing for,
beyond the unhelpful 'unjustified entrenchment."' Id. at 299.
14 See id. at 311.
15 See id.
13
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Justice Kennedy says that he knows of no sufficient standard for
identifying unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders but unlike the plurality, he declines to conclude that no sufficient standard exists. 16 Also in
contrast to the plurality, Justice Kennedy at least makes a slight nod towards explaining how a partisan gerrymander might offend the Constitution.17 His effort, though, is far too vague, feeble, and misguided to be
of any help.
I explain in this paper why I think the Court went 0 for 5 in Vieth.
Because Justice Scalia successfully demonstrates the weaknesses of the
other four opinions, I concentrate on the plurality opinion. In addition, I
address the important question of what the law is now. I conclude that
Bandemer is still good law. This is no doubt an odd conclusion, because
all nine justices seem implicitly or explicitly to have rejected it in Vieth.
For that reason, I confess a certain shakiness. Nevertheless, the conclusion finds support in the principle that you can't replace something with
nothing.
I.

JUSTICIABILITY

Writing for the plurality in Vieth, Justice Scalia quotes the passage
from Baker v. Carr 8 in which the Court listed the reasons why a question tendered to a federal court may be nonjusticiable. 19 The plurality
concludes that the second reason in the Baker list-"a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" the issue 2 0 -renders constitutional attacks on partisan gerrymanders nonjusticiable. It is
perhaps surprising that Justice Scalia did not dwell on the first of the
Baker reasons for nonjusticiability, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department." As
he himself later points out, Article I, § 4 of the Constitution empowers
Congress to "make or alter" the states' arrangements for House elections.
Justice Scalia further shows that Congress has made frequent use of this
power. 2' Why not conclude, then, that the power to oversee how state
legislatures define congressional districts has been constitutionally committed in a textually demonstrable way to Congress?
One reason could be Wesberry v. Sanders.22 Wesberry held that the
injunction of Article I, § 2-that the members of the House of Representatives be chosen "by the people of the several states"-implied that
16
17
18
19

See id. at 309-310.
See id. at 313-314.
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
541 U.S. at 277-78 (quoting 369 U.S. at 217).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 273-278.
22 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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23 If Article I, § 4
districts within a state must have equal populations.
demonstrably committed the control of congressional district malapportionment to Congress to the exclusion of the federal courts, then the
Court should have declined to take on that assignment in Wesberry. Is it
possible to believe that Article 1, § 4 demonstrably commits control of
partisan gerrymandering to Congress but does not similarly commit control of malapportionment? 24 Perhaps, on the ground that the Constitution
(according to Wesberry) prohibits malapportionment, but contains no
similar prohibition against partisan gerrymandering (so long as the districts are equally populated). Congress is thus free to regulate partisan
gerrymandering or not as it sees fit, but cannot validate malapportionment in the face of the specific (although not explicit) constitutional prohibition. On this understanding, both Congress and the courts have a
responsibility to prevent malapportionment, but prevention of gerrymandering lies within the discretion of Congress. The weakness of this approach is that it requires a conclusion on the substantive constitutional
issue, which is supposed to be avoided when the issue is nonjusticiable.
Despite an uneasy fit with Wesberry, the hypothesis that the partisan
gerrymandering claim in Vieth was nonjusticiable by reason of a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to Congress should have had
considerable appeal. For one thing, it would have led to a modest decision limited to congressional districting plans. The justiciability of gerrymandering claims against districting plans for state legislatures and
local governing bodies would have been left open. If the reputedly conservative judges who made up the Vieth plurality really believed in the
passive virtues as a form of judicial restraint, they ought to have found
attractive the narrow reach of such a decision.
Furthermore, such a holding of nonjusticiability in Vieth would have
honored stare decisis by avoiding conflict with Bandemer, which concerned a state legislature. 25 Indeed, the stare decisis benefit of avoiding
a direct conflict with Bandemer should have outweighed the detriment of
creating tension far short of a direct conflict with Wesberry. Even that
tension dissipates if we consider Baker's reasons for nonjusticiability not
as entirely distinct but as mutually reinforcing. That is, if there is room
to doubt whether oversight of congressional redistricting is demonstrably
committed to Congress by Article I, § 4, a federal court might resolve

See id. at 17.
1 now believe that the discussion of this subject in the Teacher's Manual for the third
Richard Hasen's and my textbook did not adequately appreciate the force of this
of
edition
question. See DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW, THIRD EDITION:
TEACHER'S MANUAL 65 (2004).
23

24

25 But see Badham v. Eu, 694 F.Supp. 664,667-68 (N.D.Cal. 1988), affd, 488 U.S. 1024
(1989) (reading Bandemer to hold that a complaint of partisan gerrymandering in a congressional redistricting plan was justiciable).
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that doubt in favor of justiciability when a readily discoverable and
highly manageable standard is available for judicial resolution as in the
case of malapportionment. An issue would be nonjusticiable when any
standard at all is hard to discover and likely to be very difficult to manage, as the Vieth plurality believed to be true in the case of partisan
gerrymandering.
Yet another consideration favoring a finding of nonjusticiability by
reason of Article I, § 4 is that the central objection to partisan gerrymandering is one that the courts are peculiarly unable to address in the case
of congressional districting. The central objection is that the representational system converting votes into legislative seats favors one party over
the other. Congressional districting occurs state-by-state, so that a challenge to a congressional redistricting plan puts in question only the districts of a small fraction of the House of Representatives, even if the plan
in question is that of the largest state. A finding of improper advantage
for one party in one state-whatever an "improper advantage" might be
in this context and however it might be determined-would not imply an
advantage for the party in the House as a whole. The favored treatment
might be offset by an advantage for the other party in other states, so that
judicial relief could easily exacerbate rather than ameliorate favoritism
overall. 2 6 This peculiar incapacity is unique to judicial review of partisan gerrymandering in congressional districting. It does not affect Congress, which could impose uniform districting requirements on all the
states under its Article I, § 4 power.27 Nor does it afflict a court when it
reviews state or local redistricting plans. In such cases, the court can
take into account the system of representation for the entire body under
28
consideration.
26 This of course assumes what I deny but what any constitutional attack on gerrymandering must affirm, that it is meaningful to attribute partisan "favoritism" to a politically drawn
districting plan. In my view, one plan may be more favorable to a party than another plan, but
there is no normative benchmark against which the plans can be measured to ground a claim of

favoritism.
27 A proposed Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act that would require each
state to use a commission for congressional redistricting has recently been introduced in the
House. For a description and endorsement of the proposal, see Editorial, Time to put an end to
the gerrymander, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, July 23, 2005, at 10B, available at http://
www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/editorials/stories/MYSA072305.
10.redistrictingled.bfb l c5b.
html. I strongly oppose passage of any such legislation, but concede that it is squarely within

the constitutional powers delegated to Congress, whereas interference by the federal judiciary
into districting on grounds of partisan gerrymandering absent the peculiar and unlikely circumstances allowed for in Davis v. Bandemer seems to me entirely unwarranted by any express or
implied provision of the Constitution.
28 For a thorough consideration of the incapacity of courts to review partisan gerrymandering in House districting, in contrast to state or local districting, see generally Adam B. Cox,
Partisan Gerrymanderingand DisaggregatedRedistricting, 2004 Sup. CT. REv. 409.
The constitutional standard proposed by the plaintiffs in Vieth was devoid of sense in the
context of congressional districting. 541 U.S. at 283-88. Their standard included a requirement
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A final point in favor of nonjusticiability by reason of the textually
demonstrable commitment of the issue to Congress is its considerable
superiority to Justice Scalia's reliance, to which we now turn, on Baker's
second ground, "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards" for resolving the issue. 29 Preliminarily, it may be recalled that
part of the objection to relying on the textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to Congress was that doing so might require resolving
the substantive issue in order to decide on justiciability. That problem is
built into the discoverable and manageable standards criterion. How can
one decide whether the standards for determining constitutionality in a
certain type of case are discoverable and manageable without considering what the Constitution requires and how those requirements apply to
such cases? Although well beyond the scope of this paper, it should be
questioned whether the "discoverable and manageable standards" basis
for nonjusticiability might not best be scrapped, with the thought that its
useful work could be accomplished by either the textually demonstrable
conflict criterion or nonjusticiability because of "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonju30
dicial discretion.
II.
A.

IN DEFENSE OF BANDEMER

JUSTICE SCALIA'S ATFACK ON BANDEMER

In Vieth, Justice Scalia offers several reasons for concluding that the
Bandemer plurality failed to provide discoverable and manageable standards for resolving partisan gerrymandering claims. As we shall see,
these reasons do not include serious consideration of the content of the
plurality's opinion. In that sense, his rejection of Bandemer stands in
that "the court's examination of the 'totality of circumstances' confirms that the map can
thwart the plaintiffs' ability to translate a majority of votes into a majority of seats." Id. at 28687. Justice Scalia likened this proposal to a requirement of proportional representation, id. at
287, but at most the plaintiffs' standard called for a very limited version of proportionality. It
did not require a minority party to receive a proportional number of seats. Nor did it require
proportionality for a majority party, so long as it received a majority of seats. One could
understand the focus on the majority of seats if the standard had been proposed for a legislative
body within a single state, but there is nothing special about controlling a majority of a state's
delegation to the House of Representatives. Oddly, Justice Scalia did not mention this point,
though he criticized the plaintiffs' proposal on numerous other grounds, all meritorious in my
opinion. Id. at 283-90.
Justice Breyer's proposed ban on "the unjustified use of political factors to entrench a
minority in power," id. at 360 (emphasis omitted), is also senseless as applied to judicial
review of a congressional plan for the same reason and for the additional reason that members
of the House do not draw district lines and therefore are not situated to use redistricting as a
means of "entrenching" themselves under any circumstances. For a response to the objection
that House members influence legislative design of congressional districts, see infra, note 93.
29 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
30 Id.
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contrast with his primarily substantive arguments for the inadequacy of
the proposal put forth by the Vieth plaintiffs, 3 1 of Justice Powell's
33
Bandemer dissent, 32 and of the Vieth dissents.
Justice Scalia begins his attack by noting that the dissenting and
concurring justices in Bandemer, various commentators, and some lower
court judges have asserted that Bandemer failed to provide a discernible
standard. 34 That justices and commentators have attacked Bandemer on
this ground is no argument for nonjusticiability. 35 Dissenting justices
routinely claim that the majority's holding will be unworkable, 36 but
their doing so has not been thought a reason for doubting the decision's
authoritativeness, on justiciability grounds or otherwise. Even less has
the carping of disgruntled academics been thought to cast doubt on the
Court's decisions. The views expressed by lower court judges charged
with implementing the Court's decisions deserve more serious consideration. But their actual success or failure in applying Bandemer is far more
important than their complaints. 37 If one bears in mind the remarkable
consistency with which the lower courts have been able to apply
Bandemer, it becomes clear that Justice Scalia is only half right when he
cites the complaints of some lower court judges as evidence of "one long
record of puzzlement and consternation. '38 There has been consternation
on the part of those judges who would have liked to intervene more aggressively into redistricting, but precious little puzzlement over the restraint that Bandemer imposes on them.
Because it is much more pertinent to consider what the lower courts
were able to accomplish than how much the judges complained, Justice
Scalia's second claim, that the lower courts have failed to shape a stan31 Id. at 283-88.
32 Id. at 290-91.
33 Id. at 292-301.

I have previously published analysis of the Powell opinion in
Bandemer, Bandemer's Gap, supra note 3,at 91-94. I find Justice Scalia's criticism of the
Vieth plaintiffs and dissenters persuasive. Accordingly, I concentrate attention on his criticism
of the Bandemer plurality.
34 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281-85.
35 That Bandemer was "not even defended by the appellants," who were challenging the
Pennsylvania congressional plan in Vieth, is even less noteworthy. Id. at 283-84. Since the
appellants plainly could not succeed under Bandemer, it is hardly surprising that they were
uninterested in defending it. The respondents, defending the Pennsylvania plan, relied
strongly on Bandemer.

36 Justice Scalia himself often does so with great cogency.
37 By Justice Scalia's test of relying on what the lower courts say rather than what they
do, the early returns on Vieth are not encouraging. See Henderson v. Perry, No. 2:03-CV-354,
2005 WL 3370536, at *6 (E.D.Tex. June 9, 2005) ("The light offered by Vieth is dim, and the
search for a core holding is elusive"), prob. juris. noted, League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Perry, 126 S.Ct. 827 (2005); Travis County v. Perry, 126 S.Ct. 827 (2005); Jackson
v. Perry, 126 S.Ct. 827 (2005); GI Forum of Texas v. Perry, 126 S.Ct. 829 (2005).
38 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 282.
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dard, is important. But as we shall see shortly, his basis for this claim is
a non sequitur:

Nor can it be said that the lower courts have, over 18
years, succeeded in shaping the standard that this Court
was initially unable to enunciate. They have simply applied the standard set forth in Bandemer's four-Justice
plurality opinion. This might be thought to prove that
the four-Justice plurality standard has met the test of
time-but for the fact that its application has almost invariably produced the same result (except for the incurring of attorney's fees) as would have obtained if the
question were nonjusticiable: judicial intervention has
39
been refused.
As we evaluate the claim that the Bandemer standard is unmanageable, it is worth dwelling on Justice Scalia's characterization of what the
lower courts have actually done-they have "simply applied" the
Bandemer plurality's standard. 40 What better proof of manageability
could there be than experience showing that the standard can be and has
been "simply applied"?
Furthermore, that the simple application of Bandemer has yielded a
uniform result in the 18 reported cases calling for its application points
toward the presence of a workable standard. 4 1 Justice Scalia's reasoning
is a non sequitur because the fact that the results reached happen to be
the same as they would have been if these cases had been nonjusticiable
is entirely irrelevant to the question of manageability. Perhaps it would
be more efficient if that result were reached by means of barring the
courthouse doors to the plaintiffs rather than giving them their day in
court and then ruling against them. That is probably what Justice Scalia
had in mind with his reference to attorney's fees. But a total of 18 cases
in the 18 years between Bandemer and Vieth is neither a large burden on
the courts nor a large drain on the economy. 42 Whoever the named par39 Id. at 279.
40 Id. at 279. In the passage quoted, Justice Scalia emphasizes that Justice White spoke

for only four justices in Bandemer. For all practical purposes, the standards contained in
Justice White's plurality opinion are the standards that were adopted by the Court in
Bandemer. See Lowenstein, Bandemer's Gap, supra note 3, at 90-95.
41 See, e.g., Duckworth v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 332 F.3d 769 (4th Cir.

2003); Smith v. Boyle, 144 F.3d 1060 (7th Cir. 1998). There is one exception, mentioned by
Justice Scalia, Republican Party of North Carolina v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1992).

As Justice Scalia wrote, Martin "did not involve the drawing of district lines." Vieth, 541 U.S.
at 279 (emphasis omitted). The Fourth Circuit erred in believing that case was governed by
Bandemer. See LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 24, at 63.
42 There could have been unreported cases in addition to the 18 cases Justice Scalia
identified, see Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 n.6, but probably not many. Decisions in partisan gerrymandering cases brought with serious intent are likely to be published.
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ties may be, the real parties in interest are the Democrats and the Republicans, and they can afford the attorneys' fees. 43 Furthermore, even if we
were to conclude that a nonjusticiability rule is more efficient than
Bandemer, so what? Inefficiency is not a ground for nonjusticiability.
Finally, it is of no moment that the districting plans that survived
attack included some with allegedly "extreme partisan discrimination, bizarrely shaped districts, and disproportionate results."' 44 Bandemer did
not find that extreme partisan discrimination, bizarrely shaped districts,
or disproportionate results were sufficient to make a districting plan unconstitutional. Why should we be surprised that plans disliked by plaintiffs for reasons that do not render the plans unconstitutional should
survive the plaintiffs' judicial challenges?
B.

WHAT BANDEMER HELD

We have seen that the unanimity of the cases decided after
Bandemer if anything confirms its manageability rather than drawing
that manageability into question. The unanimity is nonetheless a striking
fact. Why do the political parties bring cases they will not win? Probably for two reasons. First, in some circumstances, the electoral consequences party leaders perceive to be at stake dwarf the costs of litigation,
so that suing is rational even if the probability of winning is very low.
Second, although the Bandemer standard is manageable and usually may
be applied simply (to use Justice Scalia's term), the exposition in the
plurality opinion is admittedly cryptic. The best remedy for the first of
these causes would be the passage of time. If Bandemer were reaffirmed
by the Court and major party plaintiffs lost another 18 consecutive cases
in 18 years, perhaps they would eventually get the point. The second
cause would best be remedied by clarifying Bandemer, not junking it.
Which brings us to the question of what Bandemer held. In lieu of
analyzing Bandemer or demonstrating that it is in any sense deficient,
Justice Scalia in Vieth points to the judges and commentators who have
found it unclear and concludes by quoting Bernard Grofman's statement
that he (Grofman) and I (Lowenstein) are the only two people who believe Bandemer makes sense and that our interpretations are conflicting.4 5 Everyone acquainted with Professor Grofman must have been
pleased, on reading Vieth, to see Justice Scalia make good rhetorical use
of a characteristic example of Grofman's well-known and widely appre43 Bandemer prompted national committees of the two major parties to set up programs
assisting state party groups in bringing and defending gerrymandering claims. Ronald E.
Weber, Redistricting and the Courts: JudicialActivism in the 1990s, 23 AM. POL. Q. 204, 20910 (1995).
44 541 U.S. at 280-81.
45 Id. at 283 (quoting Bernard Grofman, An Expert Witness Perspective on Continuing
and Emerging Voting Rights Controversies, 21 SrsoN L. REv. 783, 816 (1992)).
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ciated wit. At a cocktail party, the Grofman bon mot could have sufficed
to show that Bandemer was incoherent. But in a decision of the United
States Supreme Court, one might have expected Justice Scalia to go on
and ask whether either of the proposed interpretations is correct. 46 Readers will not be shocked to learn that I believe one of the interpretations
mentioned by Grofman is correct. A brief summary here will be
47
helpful.
To understand Justice White's plurality opinion in Bandemer, one
must rid one's mind of two preconceptions that have obscured the opinion's meaning for many readers. First, readers have misunderstood the
question that Justice White spent most of his time answering. The question the Bandemer plaintiffs wanted answered and that most observers
expected the Court to answer was: "When is a partisan gerrymander performed under normal circumstances of American politics unconstitutional?" Justice White's answer was short and simple: Never! But
because he did not express the point directly and because he spent most
of his time answering a quite different question, it was easy to miss his
answer.
To see what the other question was, one needs to get rid of the other
preconception, which is that Bandemer is a "fundamental voting rights"
case in the line started by Baker v. Carr,48 and Reynolds v. Sims. 4 9 Although Justice White's finding that partisan gerrymandering cases are
justiciable was based firmly on Baker and other malapportionment
cases, 50 his discussion of the merits did not draw on those cases in any
significant way. 5' Rather, he relied predominantly on cases in which the
issue was racial discrimination. 52 Why does that matter? Because it is a
sign that Bandemer falls under the "suspect classifications" branch of
Equal Protection doctrine, unlike the malapportionment cases, which fall
under the "fundamental rights" branch. A partisan gerrymander is un46 Justice Scalia uses the same pseudo-logic against the dissenting justices when he observes "that the mere fact that these four dissenters come up with three different standards-all
of them different from the two proposed in Bandemer and the one proposed here by appellants-goes a long way to establishing that there is no constitutionally discernible standard."
541 U.S. at 292. In truth, that fact by itself goes a very short way to establishing anything.
But in contrast to his failure to consider on their merits the proposed interpretations of
Bandemer, Justice Scalia does consider all the dissenting opinions individually and gives excellent reasons for rejecting them.
47 The following four paragraphs summarize my longer argument in Lowenstein,
Bandemer's Gap, supra note 3 at 69-90.
48 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
49 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
50 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 118-127.
51 See Lowenstein, Bandemer's Gap, supra note 3, at 79-81.
52 See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 412 U.S. 755 (1984); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613
(1982); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971);
Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
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constitutional under Bandemer, not because the "dishing" of one major
party by the other is "excessive," 53 but because the gerrymander is directed against a political group that is subject to pervasive discrimination
comparable to what was in the past directed against certain racial groups.
Thus, the question Justice White addressed at length was not, "when is a
normal Republican or Democratic gerrymander unconstitutional?" The
answer to that question, as mentioned above, was never. The question
that received most of Justice White's attention was, "what kind of group
would have to be the target of a gerrymander in order for the suspect
classification doctrine to render the gerrymander constitutionally
54
infirm."
The existence of a "suspect classification" is the first reason a partisan gerrymander might be unconstitutional under Bandemer and the only
reason firmly grounded in Justice White's opinion. However, there is a
second possible reason, albeit more speculative because it is based on
only a few hints in the opinion. 55 This second possibility would arise if a
partisan gerrymander somehow became an instrument so powerful that a
minority party could permanently control a state legislature, as malapportionment enabled certain regions to control some state legislatures prior
to Reynolds.
For reasons stated above, this possibility that Bandemer could be
invoked to remedy self-perpetuating minority control of a legislature
does not extend to congressional redistricting, through which no state
controls more than a small fraction of the House membership. 56 It is
almost as inapplicable to state government, for many reasons. One is
that in the case of malapportionment, the problem could and did grow
through inertia. It was the failure of legislatures to redistrict decade after
decade that caused the most characteristic malapportionment problems.
53 The "dishing of one political party by another" is the definition of partisan gerrymandering offered by David Mayhew, Congressional Representation: Theory and Practice in
Drawing the Districts, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970's 249, 274 (Nelson Polsby ed.,
1971). "Excessive manipulation" is the key phrase in the definition used by Charles Backstrom, Leonard Robins & Scott Eller, Issues in Gerrymandering:An Exploratory Measure of
PartisanGerrymanderingApplied to Minnesota, 62 MINN.L.REv. 1121, 1122 n.7 (1978). For
a collection of similar definitions, see Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest
for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory? 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 911 (1985).
54 No doubt certain political groups have experienced pervasive discrimination in the
course of American history and it is not especially improbable that such groups will exist in
the future. For such a group to be the target of a gerrymander, however, it must have sufficient
supporters, sufficiently concentrated geographically, that it could win at least one legislative
district. Usually political groups that achieve pariah status are small. Therefore, the likelihood
of a group being able to succeed under this aspect of Bandemer is also small. However, as we
shall see, the likelihood of success under the alternative claim recognized by Bandemer is even
smaller.
55 See Lowenstein, Bandemer's Gap, supra note 3, at 86-89.
56 See supra notes 26-28, and accompanying text.
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In contrast, partisan gerrymanders need to be updated to work as intended. Furthermore, by reason of the one person, one vote rule, periodic
redistricting is mandatory, making partisan reliance on inertia impossible. A second reason is that gerrymandering is by nature a self-limiting
enterprise.5 7 Using votes most efficiently against the opposing party is
achieved by shaving margins of victory in one's own party's districts as
closely as possible. But the self-interest of the gerrymandering party's
incumbents, whose support is needed to enact a plan, pushes toward
wider margins of victory for themselves. A third reason is that under
typical state governing arrangements, even if a minority party were able
to use redistricting to control the legislature for a decade, it would be
unable to update its plan for the next decade without winning the governorship-and governors are elected by majorities.5 8 Despite these considerations, which make it highly unlikely that partisan gerrymandering
could ever become an instrument of minority control of government at
59
all comparable to the malapportionment problem prior to Reynolds,
language in Bandemer hints that were such a situation to arise, the Court
would be receptive to a constitutional claim. 60 Justice White did notand did not need to-specify on what doctrinal grounds the claim would
stand.
Facts satisfying either of the bases for a cause of action suggested in
Justice White's opinion were neither alleged nor proved in any of the 18
cases in which relief has been denied. Accordingly, the uniform results
in post-Bandemer partisan gerrymandering cases confirm that the lower
courts have been able to understand Bandemer correctly and apply it
properly. But it is not only the results that confirm the lower courts'
correct understanding of Bandemer. At least some of their opinions explicitly articulate an understanding of Bandemer more or less as de57

See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 152 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
58 See Michael A. Carvin & Louis K. Fisher, "A Legislative Task": Why Four Types of
Redistricting Challenges Are Not, or Should Not Be, Recognized by Courts, 4 ELECTION L. J.
2, 7 (2005) (pointing out the unlikelihood that a minority party could consistently maintain
control of all the branches of state government necessary to update a gerrymander each
decade).
59 Justice Scalia makes the same point when he observes that Justice Breyer "gives no
instance (and we know of none) of permanent frustration of majority will" by reason of partisan gerrymandering. 541 U.S. at 300.
60 There are portions of Justice Breyer's opinion in Vieth that could be read as making
explicit what is hinted in Bandemer. If that were all Justice Breyer had in mind, I would find
his opinion entirely unobjectionable. But it clearly is not all he had in mind. This is apparent
from his concrete examples, such as his assertion that a plan would be presumptively unconstitutional if it resulted in two consecutive elections in which a "majority party" (however that
might be defined) received fewer than a majority of the seats. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 366. As
"entrenchment," such a situation would be insignificant compared to what was typical in state
legislatures before Reynolds. The disjunction between Justice Breyer's general description and
specific illustrations of his proposed standard comes uncomfortably close to disingenuousness.
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scribed above. A good example is Badham v. Eu,61 which rejected a
challenge to the California congressional plan, the most controversial redistricting plan of the 1980s 62 :
[T]here are no factual allegations regarding California
Republicans' role in "the political process as a whole."
There are no allegations that California Republicans
have been "shut out" of the political process, nor are
there allegations that anyone has ever interfered with Republican registration, organizing, voting, fund-raising, or
campaigning. Republicans remain free to speak out on
issues of public concern; plaintiffs do not allege that
there are, or have ever been, any impediments to their
full participation in the "uninhibited, robust, and wideopen" public debate on which our political system
63
relies.
A cause of action that requires such allegations is founded on "suspect
classification"- not "fundamental rights"-doctrine. 64 The key variable in a Bandemer claim is not the extremity of the plan, but the identity
of the plaintiff. Under normal conditions, neither Democrats nor Republicans are plaintiffs who can prevail in a partisan gerrymandering claim.
Nothing in Justice Scalia's opinion in Vieth attempts to refute the
interpretation of Bandemer that I have summarized here and that has
been followed universally and articulated sometimes by lower courts.
Indeed, to the best of my knowledge, no one has attempted to refute it
since its publication. 65 When Justice Scalia wrote that "no judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political gerryman61 694 F.Supp. 664 (N.D.Cal. 1988), summ. affd, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989).
62 See generally Morgan Kousser, Reapportionment War: Party, Race & Redistricting in
California, 1971-1992, in RACE AND REDISTRIC'
IN THE 1990s (Bernard Grofman ed.
1998).
63 694 F.Supp. at 670.
64 A bit of disclosure may shed light on the similar understanding of Bandemer contained in Badham and in Lowenstein, Bandemer's Gap, supra note 3. The lead attorney defending the California congressional plan was Jonathan Steinberg, my co-author in The Quest
for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 318
(1985). I consulted extensively with Mr. Steinberg during the 1980s on redistricting issues in
general and on the Badham litigation in particular. I presented a paper at the annual meetings
of the American Political Science Association a couple of months after Bandemer was decided, expressing views similar to those in Bandemer's Gap. Those views were reflected in
the Badham briefs.
65 Professor Grofman, in the same volume that contains Bandemer's Gap, disputed my
interpretation. See Bernard Grofman, Toward a Coherent Theory of Gerrymandering:
Bandemer and Thornburg, in POLMCAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE CoURTs 29, 47-53 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990). I responded to these criticisms in an appendix to Bandemer's Gap,
supra note 3, at 97-103.
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' 66
dering claims have emerged," he was (to borrow his term again)
"simply" mistaken.

III.

VIETH'S GAP

Aside from Bandemer's manageable standard for partisan gerrymandering cases, which the lower courts have followed consistently,
there is another, even more easily managed standard that the courts could
apply to decide partisan gerrymandering claims. The standard derives
from the plausible principle that partisan gerrymandering does not vio67
late the Equal Protection Clause. Any constitutional challenge to a districting plan claimed to be a partisan gerrymander would ipso facto be
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. For convenience, let us
refer to this as the null standard. Adoption of the null standard by the
Supreme Court would have the same practical effect as a ruling that partisan gerrymandering cases are nonjusticiable, but would stand on an entirely different doctrinal and conceptual basis. My purpose in identifying
it here is not to urge its adoption-though the Court could do far
worse-but to emphasize what should be an obvious point: Rejection of
the null standard requires an explanation of why and how partisangerrymandering offends the Equal Protection Clause.
Vieth's gap exists because the plurality rejected the null standard
without providing any such explanation. Contrary to what some may
suppose, the malapportionment cases do not obviate the need for an ex66 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004).
67 I do not address, other than in this footnote, the suggestion that federal courts should
entertain claims that partisan gerrymandering denies to the states a republican form of government. See generally, Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: OriginalMistakes and
Current Consequences, 24 HARv. J. OF L. & PUB. POL'Y 103 (2000-01). McConnell suggests
that a districting plan "so malapportioned that a minority faction is in complete control, without regard to democratic sentiment, violates the basic norms of republican government." Id. at
105. Perhaps so, but his arguments for abandoning Reynolds' reliance on the Equal Protection
Clause in favor of the Guarantee Clause are not persuasive. McConnell gives Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), as an example of excessive enforcement of anti-malapportionment doctrine that results from treating malapportionment as an equal protection problem. Id.
at 109. Perhaps (now) Judge McConnell is correct that the Court has been excessive in its
application of the "one person, one vote" rule to congressional plans, but the Equal Protection
Clause is not the culprit. It cannot be, because the congressional cases, including Karcher,
have not been decided under the Equal Protection Clause.
Nor would application of the Guarantee Clause be a helpful innovation in partisan gerrymandering cases. Even if one ignores the hyperbole which-it seems to me-is present in
McConnell's statement above regarding the effects of malapportionment, such effects cannot

result from gerrymandering, which requires updates, whereas the worst effects of malapportionment resulted from inertia. If the primary situation contemplated in Bandemer ever did
arise-a gerrymandering claim brought by a political group that was being treated as a pariah
group-the Equal Protection Clause, not the Guarantee Clause, would be well-suited to deal
with it.
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planation. Reynolds v. Sims 6 8 emphasized that the voting rights protected
by the Equal Protection Clause are individual rights. 69 An individual

assigned to a district whose population is equal to that of other districts
suffers no discrimination. 70 The chance of any one voter casting a decisive vote is vanishingly small no matter how the districts are drawn; beyond that chance, no voter's individual vote is more influential than any
other voter's. True, the configuration of districts affects, sometimes decisively, the opportunities available to individual politicians. But no one
has a constitutional right to be elected to office, nor to institutional arrangements that will enhance his prospects for getting elected.
The objection to partisan gerrymandering is that one's party is not
likely to do as well as it might have under a different configuration of
districts. The Vieth plurality seems to regard that prospect as violative of
the Equal Protection Clause if the detriment to the party's prospects is
"extreme," but provides no explanation of what
the constitutional difficulty is. Thus, in his discussion of Justice Souter's dissent, Justice Scalia
comments, "the test [for identifying an extreme, and thus unconstitutional, gerrymander] ought to identify deprivation of that minimal degree
of representation or influence to which a political group is constitutionally entitled. '7 1 The notion, however, that a political group is "constitutionally entitled" to at least a specified amount of influence-or of
representation, if that protean term is understood, as it apparently is here,
as something akin to influence-runs contrary to the theory of government embodied in the Constitution. The Constitution was designed on
the "republican principle," 7 2 assuring that majorities control but that all
68 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
69 See Lowenstein, Bandemer's Gap, supra note 3, at 69-74.
70 Justices Stevens and Souter, dissenting in Vieth, attempted to treat the case as one
involving individual rights. Explaining their position, Heather Gerken states
that
"[c]onceptualizing the harm as one involving intent-treating an individual differently because
of her group membership-is consistent with an individualist understanding of the
harm."
Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the Doctrinal
Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 503, 509 (2004). The trouble with this understanding
is that
individuals are not treated "differently" in any meaningful sense by a districting plan.
It is
trivially true that when members of a legislature are elected by districts, individuals are
treated
differently by being assigned to different districts. In the same trivial sense, Professor
Gerken
and I would be treated differently if we attended a conference at which the registration
lines
were divided between surnames from A-K and L-Z. The constitutional significance of
"treat-

ing an individual differently because of her group membership" comes from being treated
better or worse. An individual is neither better nor worse off from being in one equally populated district rather than another. The bad days of "separate but equal" teach us that in certain
circumstances the division itself can create an advantage or disadvantage. But there is no
implicit superiority or inferiority in being grouped with one's alphabetical neighbors on a
registration line or in being placed in the First rather than the Second Congressional District.
In the same article, Professor Gerken offers a trenchant criticism of Justice Stevens'
dissent.
71 541 U.S. at 297.
72 THE FEDERALIST No. 10., at 58 (James Madison) (Heritage Press ed., 1945).
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groups have the opportunity to act freely. The Constitution does not implement the republican principle by assuring each group a quota of influence. Rather, it creates a structure (such as the popular election of House
members) and guarantees rights (such as the freedom of speech), the
combination of which is likely to give all groups the opportunity to compete for influence. The plurality criticizes Justice Souter for failing to
specify how much influence will satisfy the minimum, but all the justices, the plurality included, fail to identify any constitutional principle
supporting the notion that the Court should be concerning itself with a
major political party's degree of influence in the first place.
Justice Scalia is even less helpful when he says that the plurality
"do[es] not disagree" with that portion of Justice Stevens' dissent "addressed to the incompatibility of severe partisan gerrymanders with democratic principles. '73 In response to Justice Breyer the plurality concedes
that the Constitution creates a "basically democratic form of government" but calls that an "incredibly abstract" starting point that is a "long
and impassable distance away" from specific considerations relating to
partisan gerrymandering. 74 Surely Justice Stevens' invocation of "democratic principles" is just as abstract and just as far away from specific
considerations relating to gerrymandering as is Justice Breyer's invocation of "basically democratic" government. A similar tension exists between Justice Scalia's concession to Justice Stevens that an "excessive
7 5 and his earlier asinjection of politics [into redistricting] is unlawful"
sertion that the Constitution "clearly contemplates districting by political
entities . .. and unsurprisingly that turns out to be root-and-branch a
matter of politics."' 76 How can there be an excessive injection of politics
into something that is root-and-branch a matter of politics?
Possibly, the plurality's statements to the effect that "extreme" partisanship in redistricting offends the Constitution-statements such as,
"[t]he central problem is determining when political gerrymandering has
gone too far" 77-are meaningless concessions, either made for tactical
purposes (perhaps to attract a stray vote to the plurality) or made
thoughtlessly. More likely they should be taken seriously, as they help to
explain Justice Scalia' s shoddy treatment of Bandemer. If the only question about Bandemer is its manageability, then the assertion that its unmanageability is demonstrated by showing that the lower courts have
applied it consistently is risible-so risible that it is difficult to suppose
Justice Scalia and his colleagues in the plurality could believe it. But, if
73

74
75
76
77

541 U.S. at 292.
Id. at 299 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 293 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 285.
Id. at 296.
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the plurality believes that "excessive" partisan gerrymanders committed
by one major party against another are constitutionally offensive, their
discussion of Bandemer may be seen in a different light. Like the lower
court judges who experienced more consternation than puzzlement, 78 the
plurality justices believe that a proper standard ought to result in voiding
some partisan gerrymanders that occur in the normal course of politics. 79

That would account for Justice Scalia's complaint that under Bandemer,
"districting plans were.., upheld despite allegations of extreme partisan
discrimination, bizarrely shaped districts, and disproportionate results."'80
As has already been pointed out, that should have been no occasion for
surprise, because under Bandemer such allegations fail to state a constitutional violation in a case pitting one major party against the other. At
bottom, the plurality's real objection to Bandemer was not its failure to
set a workable standard, but disagreement with the standard Bandemer
set.
If, according to the plurality, partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional when it goes "too far," the problem of the gap between the standard applied to a plan and the constitutional principles on which the
standard rests, arises once again. 8 1 That gap is not eliminated by the
plurality's conclusion that courts have proven unable to implement a
standard condemning plans that go "too far." The question still hovers,
what makes a plan that goes "too far" unconstitutional? Ironically, the
plurality seems quite aware of the significance of the gap in its criticism
of the dissenters, as when it chides Justice Souter for proposing a test
without an adequate explanation of "what he is testing for. ' 82 It is as
great a fallacy-or almost as great-to conclude that a test is impossible
without specifying what one would like to test for. All the justices in
Vieth start with the assumption that "extreme partisanship"-partisanship
that goes "too far"-is unconstitutional. The fundamental difference
among them is whether courts are capable of determining that a particular districting plan is too extreme. None of them attempts to close the
gap between their starting assumption and the principles of the Constitution. Nor could they. That starting assumption is not only unmoored to
78 See supra, text accompanying note 38.
79 One writer, in a nicely-turned phrase, observes that for the plurality, "the justiciability
problem is epistemological, not ontological." Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 459, 495 (2004).
80 541 U.S. at 280-81.
81 Mitchell Berman assumes he can develop satisfactory doctrine for constitutional challenges to partisan gerrymandering without bridging the gap, i.e., without concerning himself
with what it is about partisan districting that violates the Constitution. See Mitchell N.
Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REv. 781, 783 (2005). Although aspects of
Professor Berman's project can be admired for their ingenuity, the enterprise seems to me to
be hollow.
82 541 U.S. at 297 (emphasis in original). For additional examples, see supra, note 13.
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the Equal Protection Clause or any other constitutional provision-it
runs contrary to the Constitution,
The Constitution eschews primary reliance on "exterior provisions"
8 3
As James Madison wrote in Federalfor controlling abuses of power.
ist No. 51, each department of government should have a "will of its
own."'84 Nor does the Constitution abjure self-interest on the part of
elected officials. To the contrary, it relies on self-interest-"personal
motives"-to assure that "[a]mbition [will] be made to counteract ambition."' 85 "The interest of the man," Madison writes, "must be connected
' 86
In short, the Constitution
with the constitutional rights of the place."
does not try to prevent political competition from going "too far." It
depends on competition to preserve the balanced structure of
government.
This is not to deny that it is possible for competition to produce
imbalance. Bandemer allowed for that possibility. Groups treated as pariahs-groups such as African Americans in the South until the mid1960s-are excluded from the competitive system and therefore cannot
protect their rights or advance their interests. Extreme and inertial malapportionment arguably prevented political competition from restoring
an imbalance that developed over time. That partisan gerrymandering
between the major parties can create similar problems under present or
foreseeable circumstances is extremely improbable at least, but
Bandemer allows even for that possibility. Beyond such possibilities, the
Constitution harnesses self-interest to preserve vigorous competition. As
it happens, competition between the major parties is flourishing in today's America as strongly as it ever has. As for partisan gerrymanders,
far from being devices that stifle competition, they are instruments of
competition. They are the outgrowth of the "interest of the man [or, we
might add, party, being] . . . connected with the constitutional rights of
'8 7

the place."

It does not follow that opponents of a particular districting plan
speak incoherently or against the constitutional structure when they
claim that a districting plan is "too extreme" or "excessive" or "goes too
far." What does follow from my argument is that these are political, not
constitutional claims. Taxes may be "excessive," the Patriot Act may be
"too extreme," and prison sentences may go "too far"-or some in the
polity may think so. Those are perfectly legitimate and no doubt plausible views, but they are not constitutional arguments.
83
84
85
86

THE FEDERALIST No. 51., at 346 (James Madison) (Heritage Press ed., 1945).
Id. at 347.

Id.
Id. at 347-48.

87 Id. at 348.
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Consider the opening passage of Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion
in Vieth:
The use of purely political considerations in drawing district boundaries is not a "necessary evil" that, for lack of
judicially manageable standards, the Constitution inevitably must tolerate. Rather; pure politics often helps to
secure constitutionally important democratic objectives.
But sometimes it does not. Sometimes purely political
"gerrymandering" will fail to advance
any plausible
democratic objective while simultaneously threatening
serious democratic harm. And sometimes when that is
so, courts can identify an equal protection violation and
88
provide a remedy.
It appears that the entire Court more or less agrees with all but the last
sentence of that quotation. The plurality disagrees with the last sentence
and Justice Kennedy is not sure. But their difficulty with the last sentence is a denial of its practicality, not a difference in principle.
Suppose we adapt the passage, changing only the subject-from
gerrymandering to taxation:
The use of high taxes in fiscal policy is not a "necessary
evil" that, for lack of judicially manageable standards,
the Constitution inevitably must tolerate. Rather, high
taxation often helps to secure constitutionally important
democratic objectives. But sometimes it does not.
Sometimes "confiscatory" taxation will fail to advance
any plausible democratic objective while simultaneously
threatening serious democratic harm. And sometimes
when this is so, courts can identify an equal protection
violation and provide a remedy.
I daresay that all the members of the Court and the great majority of
other Americans would agree with all but the last sentence of that passage-though, of course, we would differ over when taxation becomes
confiscatory and harmful, just as opponents of gerrymandering differ
over the kinds of plans they find offensive. But when Justice Breyer's
passage is rewritten to deal with taxation, the last sentence becomes not
only controversial but jarring. The same would be true if the paragraph
dealt with environmental regulation, public utility rate setting, or hundreds of additional, easily imagined issues.
Any government policy could be "excessive." Our Constitution sets
up a political system that its framers hoped and two centuries of experi88 541 U.S. at 355 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
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ence pretty well confirm tends to control excess before it becomes truly
destructive. It does not do that by authorizing the courts to decide that
taxes are too high, that environmental regulations are too far-reaching, or
that agricultural subsidies are too generous. The intuition held by many,
that partisan districting plans are sometimes excessive, is as legitimate as
the view held by others that the minimum wage is excessive. Neither
belief justifies the conclusion that the policy in question violates the
Constitution.
Is there any basis for assuming that partisan districting is restricted
by the Constitution more than other controversial policies? If we look
first at the text of the Constitution, the answer is clearly negative. All but
congressional districting is left entirely to the states; congressional districting is also left to state legislatures, though subject to congressional
oversight. 89 The Supreme Court has found in the Constitution a protection of individual voting rights that precludes the creation of malapportioned districts, but as has been shown, partisan districting, no matter
90
how "extreme," does not implicate individual voting rights. The Constitution imposes no other substantive restrictions on redistricting.
Even less can one argue that the Constitution should be understood
to prohibit "extreme" partisanship because excess is peculiarly harmful
in the case of districting. The opposite is true. Partisan gerrymandering
works at the margin. So do party politicians, which is why they find
redistricting a subject of abiding interest. For the ordinary citizen, the
9
shifting of a few legislative seats is a matter of small consequence. '
Genuinely confiscatory taxation would be much more destructive to our
country and its form of government than any gerrymander could possibly
be, no matter how outrageous some may find it. The same would be true
of extreme excess in almost any significant policy domain, in comparison to districting.
Some may claim districting is different from other policy domains,
because of the conflict of interest inherent in incumbent politicians protecting their own careers. 9 2 Aside from the claim's irrelevance to con-

89 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
90 See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
91 To be sure, a voter may have a partisan interest in a swing of a few seats. The detriment for one group of voters would be offset by the benefit for their opponents. Election law
presumably is neutral regarding partisan swing between the parties.
92 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 593, 626 (2002) (arguing that even if, as he seems to concede, the empirical case is weak
that redistricting is a major element in incumbents' electoral advantage, districting by incumbents is still objectionable because "district lines are manipulated for the purpose of protecting
incumbents from effective challenge").
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gressional districting, which is not enacted by members of Congress, 93 it
is singularly naive. A premise underlying much contemporary study of
legislative politics is that all legislative conduct is motivated solely by
the desire for reelection. 94 Few if any observers would agree with the
proposition thus strongly stated, but no one doubts that the motive for
reelection is a major influence in virtually all legislative policymaking. 95
Some legislation, popularly called pork-barrel legislation, is universally
recognized as largely if not entirely motivated by political advantage.
Pork-barrel legislation is wasteful and its indirect effects-for example,
when its distortions adversely affect military preparedness-can be far
more harmful than anything that might flow from a partisan gerrymander. The harm of pork is widely recognized, but no one says that if pork
goes "too far" it is unconstitutional, nor that it would be if only we had a
way of distinguishing "excessive" pork from moderate pork.
Pork is harmful. Although we cannot eliminate it, we rely on political action to keep it under tolerable control. It is not unconstitutional.
The harm from a partisan gerrymander performed by one major party
against the other is not nearly as clear as the harm from pork and there is
no apparent way in which "excessive" major-party gerrymandering offends the Constitution. In Bandemer and Vieth, numerous members of
the Supreme Court have assumed that it does, but while many of them
have proposed specific "standards" for measuring gerrymanders against
the Constitution-none, however, that has yet enlisted the support of
more than two members of the Court-none has been able to bridge the
gap to explain what constitutional principle is violated by partisan gerrymandering. The gap is bridgeable only in the case of the Bandemer plurality opinion, because their standard limits itself to situations in which
there really are cognizable constitutional principles at stake. Ordinary
gerrymandering between the major parties does not implicate such
principles.

93 It is true that House members often have considerable influence over the drawing of
district lines. That does not differentiate them from any other interest group with considerable

influence over legislation affecting its members.
94 The seminal work is DAvID R. MAYHEw, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION
(2d ed. 2004).
95 Even Mayhew did not believe desire for reelection could explain all congressional
behavior. See id. at 141-158. Another classic of contemporary political science begins with
the premise that members of Congress are motivated by the desire for reelection, advancement
within Congress, and policy influence. RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 1 (1973).
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IV.

THE LAW AFTER VIETH

If we want to know what the law is now, we must begin with Justice
Kennedy's opinion. The first question is whether Justice Scalia is correct
when he says:
What are the lower courts to make of [Justice Kennedy's
opinion]? We suggest that they must treat it as a reluctant fifth vote against justiciability at district and statewide levels-a vote that may change in some future case
but that holds, for the time being, that this matter is
96
nonjusticiable.
If this characterization of Justice Kennedy's opinion were correct, then
partisan gerrymandering claims would be nonjusticiable in federal
courts, for now at least. It would be the duty of the lower federal courts
to refuse to hear such claims.
Unfortunately, Justice Scalia's construction of Justice Kennedy's
opinion is probably incorrect. The closest Justice Kennedy comes to addressing the question directly is his statement that "the arguments [for
nonjusticiability] are not so compelling that they require us now to bar all
future claims of injury from a partisan gerrymander. '97 That statement is
not inconsistent with Justice Scalia's reading that the issue is currently
nonjusticiable. Justice Scalia could understand Justice Kennedy to be
simply opening up the possibility that at some time in the future the issue
might become justiciable again. Partisan gerrymandering would "now"
be barred, but not necessarily all "future claims," namely those occurring
after the future date on which the Court might again rule the issue to be
justiciable. That reading, however, seems less natural, or at least no
more so, than understanding Justice Kennedy to mean that "future"
claims-meaning any that arise after today-are not "now" barred. The
word "all" presents problems for this reading, but in context that word is
probably a recognition that most such claims are likely to be unsuccessful. The rest of the concurrence seems, in a halting and hesitating way,
to contemplate future litigation. If so, that tips the scales decisively in
favor of the second interpretation.
If Justice Kennedy's opinion preserves the justiciability of gerrymandering claims, it nevertheless determinedly avoids any reading of the
Constitution that can or does give guidance as to what might make a
partisan gerrymander unconstitutional. Justice Kennedy even seekscontrary to the most basic notion of stare decisis- to prevent the fact
that relief was denied to the Pennsylvania plaintiffs from being used as a
datum in constructing an account of the constitutional principles affect96

541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004).

97 Id. at 309.
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ing gerrymandering. "[I]f a subsidiary standard could show how an otherwise permissible classification, as applied, burdens representational
rights," Justice Kennedy wrote, "we could conclude that appellants' evidence states a provable claim." 98 Despite this statement, Vieth should
count as a precedent holding that a challenge in circumstances like those
of the Pennsylvania case is without merit, because what the Court decides, not what the Justices' opine, is the precedent. 99 Nevertheless, the
single datum consisting of the ruling against the Vieth plaintiffs gives
little guidance for the decision of future cases and Justice Kennedy's
opinion simply points to the absence of a standard on which he is willing
to base his ruling.
Justice Kennedy's position is irresponsible for reasons well-stated
by Justice Scalia:
The first thing to be said about Justice Kennedy's disposition is that it is not legally available. The District
Court in this case considered the plaintiffs' claims justiciable but dismissed them because the standard for unconstitutionality had not been met. It is logically
impossible to affirm that dismissal without either (1)
finding that the unconstitutional-districting standard applied by the District Court, or some other standard that it
should have applied, has not been met, or (2) finding (as
we have) that the claim is nonjusticiable. Justice Kennedy seeks to affirm "[b]ecause, in the case before us,
we have no standard." But it is our job, not the plaintiffs', to explicate the standard that makes the facts alleged by the plaintiffs adequate or inadequate to state a
claim. We cannot nonsuit them for our failure to do
00

SO.1

Justice Kennedy thus acted irresponsibly, perhaps unprecedentedly
so. 101 The result is an interesting puzzle: where do we stand now? I

wish to pursue the question in an old-fashioned way, by asking not what
the Court will do in the future but, rather, what is the law now? That
should be the question asked by lower court judges presented with parti98 Id. at 314.
99 See generally Daniel Hays Lowenstein, "Too Much Puff': Persuasion,Paternalism,
and Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1237-47 (1988) (arguing for inductive
rather than deductive reasoning from judicial precedents).
100 541 U.S. at 301.
101 I am not using "irresponsible" as an all-purpose pejorative and do not suggest that
because Justice Kennedy's opinion is unusually and perhaps uniquely irresponsible, it is therefore unusually or uniquely harmful. I use the term more precisely to assert that Justice Kennedy failed to carry out his most elemental responsibility as a judge, to decide the case under
the law.
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san gerrymandering cases. My surprising conclusion is that Bandemer v.
Davis is still the law. Surprising, because it seems fairly clear from the
Vieth opinions that no Justice then on the Court agreed with Bandemer.
But I am proceeding on the premise that the law is not a prediction of
what the nine Justices will say in a future case nor a psychological inquiry into what they want, but what can fairly be gleaned from the decisions they have already issued. As Justice Scalia has written in the
context of statutory interpretation, "it is simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the
meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by
what the lawgiver promulgated. . .. It is the law that governs, not the
intent of the lawgiver." 10 2 Justice Scalia's point is more compelling as
applied to judicial decisions. If, as Justice Scalia has maintained, a judge
is not a "representative" in the ordinary sense of that word, 10 3 part of the
reason is that the rule of law requires that the judge's personal desires be
04
Precedent consists of what the
no proper part of his decision-making. 1
Court has decided supplemented by the Justices' explanations, not the
Justices' subjective preferences. It is the proper function of the lower
court judge to observe the Court's holdings, not to predict what the individuals on the Court are likely to do.
What, then, is the state of the law after Vieth? The status quo when
Vieth was decided was defined by Bandemer. Bandemer's first point
was that partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable. As we have
seen, the Vieth plurality's view, based on its reading of Justice Kennedy's concurrence, is that the justiciability portion of Bandemer has
been overruled. For reasons stated above, that view appears to be mistaken.10 5 The practical question is, what should the lower courts do
when partisan gerrymandering plaintiffs walk through the courtroom
door, as the justiciability ruling of Bandemer, undisturbed by Vieth, permits them to do. Probably most people think the lower courts should do
one of two things, each of which I shall argue against.
The first is to follow a variant of Justice Scalia's assertion that for
all practical purposes, Justice Kennedy's vote is a vote against justiciability. This approach is based on the plausible reading of the concurrence that until the skies open up and a new gospel on gerrymandering is
102 ANTONIN SCALIA,

A

MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW

17

(1997).
103

See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

104 Among political theorists, the propriety of legislators acting on the basis of their own

wills is more controversial. Cf.Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, in LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 2 at I1-12 ( inaugurating a debate on the subject that has endured
for over two centuries).
105 I know of no published commentary that agrees with the plurality's interpretation of
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion.
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revealed for one and all to see (or, at least, for Justice Kennedy to see),
Justice Kennedy will vote against any gerrymandering claim. The lower
court therefore would not rule the action nonjusticiable, but as a practical
matter would decline to entertain it. This is probably what Michael
Carvin and Louis Fisher have in mind when they say that "political gerrymandering claims are effectively dead." 10 6 Even if federal courts generally take this approach, it will not necessarily be the end of the story.
James Gardner has suggested that plaintiffs can seek relief in state courts,
which will therefore have an opportunity to develop standards that might
eventually satisfy a majority on the Supreme Court. 10 7 Professor Gardner's suggestion might turn out to be a correct prediction, but it cannot be
a correct prescription for what ought to happen. State and federal judges
are both obliged to follow the law. When they are interpreting the federal Constitution there can be only one correct law for them to follow, no
matter how uncertain it may be. There is plainly no majority in Vieth for
any approach to gerrymandering cases that does not include Justice Kennedy, and his opinion provides no affirmative basis for ruling that all
partisan gerrymandering claims are dead.
The second approach is to affirm that lower court judges can and
should devise whatever standards they fancy. This is pretty much what
the dissenting justices in Vieth seemed to think they had a license to do.
Indeed, it is inevitable for anyone who favors judicial review of partisan
gerrymandering without confronting and bridging the gap, that is, the
missing connection between applicable constitutional principles and the
standards being applied. Under this approach, a thousand flowers will
bloom and, sooner or later, one may smell sweet enough to win the approval of a majority of the Supreme Court. This approach is contrary to
the rule of law. Judges do not have license to make up solutions to social
problems, perceived or actual, and impose them on the citizenry. That is
the legislative function. "Standards" applied by courts should be based
on an interpretation of the law. In the present context, the relevant statements of the law are the constitutional text and the relevant Supreme
Court opinions.
As we have seen, the constitutional text has little to say about partisan gerrymandering, except that it is a matter for state legislatures, subject to congressional oversight in the case of districting for the House of
Representatives. There are, of course, two Supreme Court precedents of
106 Carvin & Fisher, supra note 58, at 4.
107 See James A. Gardner, A Post-Vieth Strategy for Litigating Partisan Gerrymandering

Claims, 3 ELEClON L.J. 643 (2004). Richard Hasen takes a more cautious approach, suggesting that plaintiffs will not and should not win partisan gerrymandering claims until an
"emerging social consensus" forms around the issue. See Richard Hasen, Looking for Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan Gerrymandering Claims after Vieth, 3 ELECrON
L.J. 626, 642 (2004).
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significance, Bandemer and Vieth. Everyone agrees that Justice Kennedy's opinion is pivotal to Vieth. But Justice Kennedy explicitly says
that he discerns no standard at present. He explicitly does not set forth a
standard for a lower court to employ. True, he suggests a broader constitutional value from which a gerrymandering standard should be derived.
In doing so, he at least attempts to solve the problem of what I have
called Bandemer's and Vieth's gaps.
The trouble is, his only constitutional principle is "fairness." Two
problems arise. One is the principle's basis in an erroneous analysis of
Reynolds v. Sims.' 0 8 Initially Justice Kennedy correctly cites Reynolds
for the proposition that "fair and effective representation" is the object of
redistricting. Later he slips into the common error that fairness is a constitutional right. That is a non sequitur and a misreading of Reynolds.I°9
Accordingly, the constitutional principle to which Justice Kennedy
wishes to moor a standard is not a constitutional principle at all. The
second problem, which Justice Kennedy freely acknowledges, is that
"fairness" is much too vague a standard to be of practical use.
It appears, then, that the pivotal opinion in Vieth abstains from providing guidance to the lower courts. There are no doubt judicial opinions
so vague or poorly crafted that, like dead stars, they emit no light. Justice Kennedy's opinion in Vieth is worse. True, he claims that he is
applying the standard of the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 0 but he follows
that claim with a recognition that his Fourteenth Amendment standard is
entirely contingent on a non-existent "subsidiary standard."'I' By insisting that cases must be decided on the basis of a standard that he cannot
and will not enunciate, his opinion operates less like a dead star that fails
to emit light and more like a black hole, whose gravitational pull actively
prevents any light from escaping.
The pivotal opinion abstains, then, not as a matter of degree but
categorically, from providing guidance to the lower courts. This does
not open the door to lower court judges to attempt any standard that may
recommend itself as workable, regardless of constitutional grounding.
Vieth provides no affirmative basis for rejecting partisan gerrymandering
claims.' 1 2 Nor does it provide any basis for the recognition of a partisan
gerrymandering claim, under any facts whatever. Something cannot be
replaced by nothing. I use "nothing" here, not to refer to a negative rule,
108 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
109 For discussion of this widely misused phrase from Reynolds v. Sims, see Lowenstein,

Bandemer's Gap, supra note 3, at 72-73.
110 541 U.S. at 313-14.
111 Id. at 314.
112 Except in cases that are factually indistinguishable from Vieth. However, in the absence of any explanation of what the basis for a constitutional claim would be, there is no basis
for deciding whether the facts of a case are distinguishable from those of Vieth.

394

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 14:367

such as nonjusticiability or what I have called the null standard, namely a
flat rule that partisan gerrymandering does not violate the Constitution.
"Something" (Bandemer) could have been replaced by "nothing" in the
sense of such a negative rule. But the "nothing" of Vieth is an absence of
any such negative rule, such as that offered by the Vieth plurality, as well
as of positive rules such as those offered by the Vieth plaintiffs and dissenters or that contained in the Bandemer plurality opinion. Bandemer
was in effect when Vieth came to the Court. Bandemer was something,
and the outcome in Vieth, thanks to Justice Kennedy, was nothing. Not
having been replaced, Bandemer is still binding precedent.
There is another surprising point in favor of this already surprising
conclusion. Bandemer, correctly understood, is consistent with Justice
Kennedy's fairness standard. 113 Redistricting used against a pariah
group that is facing widespread discrimination in the political process
could be unfair, in a manner easily cognizable within our constitutional
tradition. Gerrymandering so powerful that it truly blocked effective majority rule decade after decade, as malapportionment was believed by
many to do in the 1950s and early 1960s, could be held unfair in a manner sanctioned by Baker and Reynolds even if, as I believe, it is a fantastic notion. On the other hand, to say that a Democratic or Republican
gerrymander of the sort we have become accustomed to in the past two
centuries deprives anyone of "fair and effective representation" in any
fundamental sense is at best a controversial and highly contestable
proposition.
CONCLUSION
The title of this article asks whether the Supreme Court has gone
from bad to worse on partisan gerrymandering. My answer is that it has
not, because its starting point, Bandemer, was not bad but good. Admittedly obscure, it had nevertheless been correctly understood without exception in districting cases by lower courts, who far from finding it
unmanageable, applied it with remarkable consistency. No one on the
Court currently has a good word to say for Bandemer, but because of
Justice Kennedy's extraordinarily irresponsible opinion, the Court has
failed to formally overrule Bandemer. I am not predicting the lower
courts will so rule, but am claiming they would be correct to do so. The
Supreme Court could do a lot worse than to swallow its pride and restore
Bandemer to its former place.
But the more fundamental task before the Court the next time it
revisits partisan gerrymandering will be to bridge the gap between con113 This does not obviate the point that Justice Kennedy is incorrect to treat fairness as a
constitutional mandate.
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stitutional principles and standards for deciding particular cases. I believe the correct way to bridge the gap is to recognize squarely that
partisan gerrymandering between the major parties-no matter how "extreme," no matter how "excessive," no matter how "far" it goes-is not
unconstitutional. That kind of gerrymandering will undoubtedly rouse
the ire of those whose ox is gored. It may, in the eyes of some, be
contrary to the public interest. It will probably bore and be ignored by
most people. But whatever people think of it, the response to a gerrymander is a policy question to be resolved politically, not by judicial
decree unsupported by any constitutional principle more substantial than
the distaste of individual judges.

